On June 8, 1995, Tom Hartman, writing on behalf of the Indian Gaming Management staff, found that the Hudson casino posed no detriments to local communities or nearby tribal casinos.
Hartman wrote his analysis after reading the Peat Marwick economic impact report that OConnor had insisted on including in the record. By comparing the various financial studies, Hartman determined that the financial threats to nearby tribal casinos were scant: the Shakopee, for example, might suffer as much as an 8 percent decline in revenue, well within the range of normal competition.
Two weeks after Duffys office informed the White House that the application was dead, Hartman recommended approval of the Hudson casino. Hartmans report was ignored.
On July 14, 1995, Paul Eckstein met first with John Duffy and then with his old friend Bruce Babbitt to lobby on behalf of the Chippewas and their Hudson casino.
It was too late.
Later that day, Michael Anderson signed a brief order rejecting the casino. The order contradicted everything Anderson had told Dacey and Doxator on May 22.
Andersons order, edited by Duffy, ignored the departments own criteria.
Instead, Andersons order fabricated two new standards for denial: community opposition and impact upon competing tribal casinos.
But there was no clear mandate of community opposition and Interiors own staff, after reviewing the Peat Marwick report, found the threat to other reservation casinos to be minimal.
In depositions Interior officials claimed they had another, sub-rosa, concern. They did not want to stir up antigambling sentiment by granting a gaming license off a reservation.
Anderson said under oath that the department had never granted such gambling in the past.
The next day he corrected himself in deposition and said two such applications had been approved.
Babbitts press liaison said earlier this week that in actuality there have been 10.
The story keeps changing.
In the Hudson casino case, Interior ignored the statutes, then created criteria that dont hold up upon inspection, and, finally, resorted to invoking shadow concerns.
Yet Babbitt, Collier, Duffy and Sibbison all insist in their statements that politics and campaign contributions had no influence upon the decision.
And when Ickes testified before the Senate committee, he said his offices calls to Interior werent political pressure, merely an effort to check on status.
Sibbison agreed that the correspondence with the White House were simply status reports.
Clearly there is nothing in the paperwork that suggests that Ickes imposed his will upon Interior.
The question is: How did Interiors political operatives interpret Ickes interest, and the interest of the Minnesota congressional delegation, and the interest of DNC chairman Dan Fowler and the interest of the DNCs trustee, Patrick OConnor.
The official line on the status reports is misleading.
After all, OConnor didnt need the White House to check on the status of his clients concerns. From the beginning, OConnor had access to Interiors top people.
When you examine the record, the explanations of the political appointees at Interior have high odor.
Its like listening to Bruce Babbitts explanations of how Ickes name popped up in the conversation with Paul Eckstein.
First Babbitt said Eckstein was mistaken. He denied ever saying that Ickes wanted a prompt decision.
Then Babbitt told Senator Fred Thompson that he did mention Ickes.
But he insisted that his statement was still operative because it was the modifier, prompt, that Babbitt objected to.
Finally, he settled upon, yes, okay, hed mentioned Ickes. But hed made the whole thing up to get rid of Eckstein, who was getting on his nerves.
Babbitt sat in front of the Senate committee looking like the uncomfortable love child of John Dean and Richard Nixon, swearing under oath that he was telling the truth.
© 1995-98 Weekly Wire